Introduction

Acknowledgement of First Peoples

The Board of Inquiry into the McCrae landslide acknowledges Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as the first peoples and Traditional Owners and custodians of the land and waterways on which we live. We honour and pay our respects to Elders past and present.

Letter of Transmission

Introduction

On 18 March 2025, the Board of Inquiry was established to inquire into, report on, and make recommendations in relation to, amongst other things, the cause of the landslide that occurred on 14 January 2025 in McCrae on the Mornington Peninsula (McCrae Landslide), the adequacy of measures taken to prevent and minimise landslides in McCrae, and measures to be taken for the prevention or mitigation of the risk of similar landslide events occurring again in McCrae.

The McCrae Landslide occurred on the escarpment of 6 and 10–12 View Point Road in McCrae on the morning of 14 January 2025. The landslide has had a profound impact on the McCrae community. It destroyed Kellie and Nicholas (Nick) Moran’s house which once stood at 3 Penny Lane. It has upended the lives of many residents who were evacuated and have since been displaced.

The impact the McCrae Landslide has had on residents extends well beyond property damage. The psychological and emotional toll for members of the McCrae community has been, and continues to be, significant.

The McCrae Landslide was not an isolated landslide event. It was preceded by a smaller landslide nine days earlier, on 5 January 2025, which damaged the back of 3 Penny Lane. Remarkably, a little more than two years earlier, two landslides occurred in quick succession in November 2022, damaging two properties. Those landslides also occurred on the escarpment of 10–12 View Point Road, to the west of the site of the McCrae Landslide.

Given the history of landslides in McCrae, and the impact on the community, it was time to find the answers to the important and unanswered questions being asked by the community.

Within a short time of the Board of Inquiry commencing work, it was ascertained that it would be necessary to engage an expert geotechnical engineer to opine on the cause of the McCrae Landslide because no other expert had yet provided an opinion. Preeminent geotechnical engineer, Darren Paul, was then engaged.

Determining the cause of a landslide is often complex. They can be caused by the interaction of multiple factors – some of which are natural, some of which are anthropogenic (that is, caused by human activity). Complexities reside in disentangling these causal factors and weighing their relative contributions.

Notwithstanding those complexities, a simple point ultimately emerged: the November 2022 landslides, the 5 January 2025 landslide, and the McCrae Landslide share a common causal factor–water.

The Board of Inquiry has found that the McCrae Landslide and the earlier landslide of 5 January 2025 were caused by water that leaked from a burst water main owned by South East Water (SEW). That burst water main was located approximately 450 metres south of 3 Penny Lane, near the corner of Bayview Road and Outlook Road. The burst water main had leaked for several months prior to its repair over New Year's Eve, releasing about 40.3 million litres of water during the period it was undetected – the equivalent of about 16 Olympic-sized swimming pools.

In the months leading up to the McCrae Landslide, residents knew that something was not right. Water from an unknown source was observed on the streets uphill of 3 Penny Lane throughout November and December 2024. The water roared in the stormwater drainage system. It bubbled up through the roads. It pushed up and cracked the bitumen. It created potholes. It flowed down the streets. It saturated and seeped from the nature strips.

Throughout November and December 2024, residents of McCrae raised their concerns about the water with both the Mornington Peninsula Shire Council (Shire) and SEW. The complaints were numerous.

For many weeks, no one knew the source of the water – not the residents, the Shire nor SEW. The water was thought to be related to potential issues with stormwater drainage, road drainage or SEW’s water mains. The Shire and SEW treated the water issues with varying degrees of priority.

While the Shire and SEW took steps in response to those water issues, none were effective in preventing the water from flowing towards the escarpment on which the McCrae Landslide occurred. While each organisation invested resources and time, they operated in siloes, missing valuable opportunities for collaboration and co-ordination.

The Board of Inquiry has sought to understand why the Shire and SEW acted as they did in the lead up to the McCrae Landslide. Some reasons stand out.

First, neither the Shire nor SEW knew at the relevant time that the water surfacing on the streets of McCrae throughout November and December 2024 was caused by the burst water main. The burst was only discovered on 30 December 2024 and repaired in the early hours of New Year’s Day. The burst was not easy to find.

Second, neither appreciated the seriousness of excess water accumulating in an area adjacent to a steep escarpment with high susceptibility to landslides. As a result, they did not respond with the urgency, nor view the situation through the appropriate lens that the situation demanded.

Third, neither prioritised the management and mitigation of landslide risk in McCrae. The Shire had not shared with SEW information regarding landslide risk in the McCrae area.

In view of all the information before the Board of Inquiry, it became apparent that landslide risk was, and is, largely forgotten. Landslide risk does not feature in the State Emergency Management Plan (SEMP). It does not feature in the Southern Metro Regional Emergency Management Plan, which is applicable to McCrae. It does not feature as a significant risk in the Mornington Peninsula Shire Municipal Emergency Plan. It does not feature in the Shire’s Asset Management Strategy and Stormwater Asset Management Plan. It does not feature in SEW’s reactive processes and procedures for detecting leaks. This must change.

One of the chief lessons the Shire, SEW, and similarly placed organisations, must take away from the work of this Board of Inquiry is that landslide risk cannot be ignored. The consequences can be devastating. Although the McCrae Landslide resulted in no fatalities, one person was seriously injured, and several others narrowly escaped harm.

History should not repeat itself in McCrae. The Shire and SEW must change their approach to managing and mitigating landslide risk in areas of high landslide susceptibility. In determining how to move forward, each organisation must look to the past to understand what has happened, why it happened, and what could have been done differently.

Meaningful progress has been made by both the Shire and SEW in advancing reform. Both organisations are reviewing their current practices and looking for ways to change and incorporate the lessons learnt from the McCrae Landslide. One of the most significant changes is that the Shire is planning a strategic assessment of landslide risk patterns across the full escarpment area and updating its asset management strategies and processes to account for landslide risk. Similarly, SEW has recognised landslide risk in its Strategic Asset Management Plan and is in the process of mapping areas potentially susceptible to landslides to guide its approach to asset management and risk control measures, including decisions regarding asset renewal in those areas.

That said, the path forward will not be without its challenges. The solutions to prevent or mitigate the risk of a further landslide in McCrae will take time and energy to implement.

In order to mitigate the risk of further landslides at the site of the McCrae Landslide, substantial works need to be carried out, involving, for example, the use of engineered rockfill. The cost of such works will not be insignificant, nor will the time required to complete them.

In order to mitigate the risk of further landslides in McCrae generally, several risk reduction measures have been recommended. These include the introduction of an Erosion Management Overlay (EMO) – a planning tool designed to address landslide risk – over parts of McCrae that are known to be highly susceptible to landslides; assessing water infrastructure; improving a range of processes; amending emergency management plans; and educating the community. The recommendations will require sustained effort over several years.

Some reforms will also need to occur on a broader scale, including at state level, so that systemwide improvements can be implemented to address landslide risk.

To recognise those challenges is not to ignore that the residents of McCrae have already endured too much stress and uncertainty. Steps need to be taken promptly so that those who have not returned home as a result of the November 2022 landslides and the McCrae Landslide are able to do so soon and safely. Equally, steps need to be taken so that residents who have since returned to their homes feel safe – that is something they both need and deserve. A mechanism has been recommended to assist all relevant parties to progress the mitigation and remediation works required at the site of the 2022 and 2025 landslides. The hope is that this will result in residents returning home sooner and the Shire and SEW being able to turn their focus to broader landslide risk mitigation activities required in McCrae.